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TOWARD A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO EVADE LAW? 
THE RULE OF POWER IN SHELBY COUNTY AND 
STATE FARM 
 
 MARTHA T. MCCLUSKEY* 
Beyond its important impact on voting rights, Shelby County, Alabama 
v. Holder1 advances a constitutional vision that inverts the rule of law, so 
that government authority becomes particularly illegitimate when it 
constrains institutional power to violate the law. This essay compares Shelby 
County to State Farm Mutual Automobile v. Campbell, 2  a 2003 Supreme 
Court ruling involving a different subject area, governed by state rather than 
federal authority. Despite these differences, both cases similarly assert new 
federal judicial power to override government efforts to prevent unlawful gain 
from exploitation of racial and economic inequality.   
 
 Authority becomes legitimate –the rule of law rather than personal 
whim -- when it must account for its actions with explanations and evidence 
subject to outside evaluation for consistency, truth, and value. In theory, the 
U.S. constitutional system holds government to account through democratic 
elections – a goal crucially advanced by the Voting Rights Act 3 and also 
through different degrees of judicial scrutiny of the justifications for 
government action. In general, constitutional doctrine requires federal judges 
to defer to the factual determinations and value judgments of other branches 
as long as these can be supported by some plausible reason (even if the 
reasons are not persuasive or proven). For some particularly exceptional 
areas of heightened constitutional concern, however, judges can demand that 
government action have stronger support in order to be valid law. 
 
I.   Uneven Concern for States’ Rights?  
 
Shelby County invalidated the coverage formula of the Voting Rights 
Act on the ground that it was an irrational use of Congress’s constitutional 
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s protection against race-based 
*Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Fellow, SUNY Buffalo Law School, 
mcclusk@buffalo.edu. 
1 Shelby Cnty, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013). 
2 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Cnty. V. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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denials of voting rights – a provision central to the Reconstruction of the 
nation after the Civil War. 4  Shelby County invoked a newly articulated 
principle of equal state sovereignty5 to explain its close scrutiny of Congress’s 
2006 decision to renew the longstanding formula for targeting the Act’s 
preventative enforcement mechanisms.  This principle of states’ equal rights 
does not derive from specific constitutional text or from the historical intent 
of the 15th Amendment, or from long-established precedent, 6  but instead 
appears to be grounded in a general theory of government structure that 
emphasizes protection of state sovereignty against federal government 
control.    
 
The Court does not carefully explain how this theory squares with the 
change in federal-state relations represented by the Reconstruction 
Amendments. The 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments turned away from the pre-
Civil War theory that states should be the primary protectors of fundamental 
liberties to instead explicitly grant new federal individual political and civil 
rights backed by specific federal enforcement authority.7 Nor does Shelby 
County clearly explain how its state sovereignty theory fits with the post-New 
Deal principle emphasizing the structural importance of judicial deference to 
democratic political processes, with federal judicial power reserved primarily 
for explicit constitutional limits, for fundamental personal rights, and for 
correcting systemic failures of the political process – such as race-based 
barriers to political power.8   
 
Indeed, Shelby County’s concern with protecting states from the 
possible burdens of federal prevention of racially discriminatory voting 
barriers appears especially questionable given the apparent inconsistency of 
the contemporary Court’s commitment to reviving state sovereignty.  The 
State Farm decision is one of a number of notable recent decisions expanding 
4 See Shelby County, 133 S.Ct. at 2614. 
5 Id. at 9 (citing Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 
(2009).  
6 Id. at 2623; 2630-31 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (arguing that the “equal sovereignty” principle 
“veers away from controlling precedent” without acknowledging that fact).  See also Eric Posner, 
John Roberts Opinion on the Voting Rights Act is Really Lame, The Supreme Court 2013:  The 
Year in Review, Blog Entry #13, SLATE, June 25, 2013 (discussing the lack of constitutional 
support for the principle).  
7 See 133 S.Ct. at 2633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Holmes’ explanation of the need 
for federal legislative protection of voting rights in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903)).  In 
contrast, the majority in Shelby County explains that narrowing federal legislative powers to 
protect states’ rights furthers individual liberties.  See 133 S.Ct. at 2626.  
8 See id. at 2623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for lack of ordinary respect for 
Congress and for disregarding the legislative record).  
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federal powers to override state policy judgments in areas of traditional state 
expertise and experimentation.9 The contrast between the Court’s rejection of 
state sovereignty in State Farm and its embrace of state sovereignty in 
Shelby County deserves analysis not simply as a reflection of arbitrary and 
unprincipled judicial power, but rather as a purposeful construction of new 
covert constitutional rules.10  
 
II.   What drives the Court’s Selective Scrutiny of Rationality?  
 
In each case, the Court appears to focus on procedural flaws in the 
government’s choice of remedy for wrongdoing, without questioning the 
government’s substantive goal of preventing violations of voting rights (in 
Shelby County) or insurance consumers’ rights (in State Farm).  In both cases, 
however, the Court’s criticism of the rationality of the decision making 
process rests on implicit substantive judgments about the nature and 
meaning of the underlying problems of unlawful activity.   
  
Shelby County suggests the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula fails 
even a basic deferential minimal rationality standard, concluding that “no 
valid reason” supported Congress’s decision to renew the law in 2006 without 
fully reconsidering the formula for selecting jurisdictions required to get prior 
federal approval for electoral changes. 11   In the majority’s analysis, 
Congress’s reliance on the original formula was “irrational” because it was 
based on “40-year-old data” rather than on current statistical evidence of 
states’ differences.12    
 
9 Richard A. Posner, The Voting Rights Act is about the Conservative Imagination, Supreme Court 
2013:  The Year in Review, Blog Entry 16, SLATE, June 26, 2013 (doubting that states’ rights is a 
value for any of the Justices, noting the Court’s recent expansion of federal citizenship rights 
limiting state police powers in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 567 F. 3d 856 (2010). 
10 It is true that some language in State Farm suggests a states’ rights theory for its ruling 
expanding federal rights.  By limiting states’ power to award high punitive damages, based on 
evidence of nationwide corporate policy affecting that state, the Court arguably protected other 
states from the burdensome effects of high damage awards on multistate corporations in their 
jurisdictions – or perhaps protected other states’ power to permit rather than punish the 
underlying multistate corporate practices. See 538 U.S. at 421-22.  Nonetheless, State Farm 
addresses this possible concern about inter-state conflict by expanding federal citizenship rights 
and narrowing state powers. The cases remain inconsistent because Shelby County took the 
opposite approach to the parallel problem that states’ racially discriminatory election regulations 
are likely to have a multistate reach, interfering with other states’ rights to fair and equal 
participation in the federal political process – a problem that the Reconstruction Amendments 
and Voting Rights Act intended to solve by expanding federal citizenship protections (contrary to 
Shelby County).  
11 133 S.Ct at 2630. 
12 Id. at 2630. 
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Constitutional scholars defending the majority’s reasoning have 
similarly faulted the coverage formula for insufficient evidence, avoiding the 
substantive question of the relative importance of state sovereignty compared 
to federal political citizenship and racial equality.  For example, 
constitutional scholar Suzanna Sherry acknowledges Shelby County’s 
potentially harmful impact on constitutionally protected voting rights, but 
explains that Congress, not the Court, is at fault for exercising abnormal, 
unprincipled, power based on unwise and arbitrary judgment.13  She insists 
that a “rational, functional Congress” would have modified the current 
coverage formula when renewing the Voting Rights Act to ensure that the Act 
targets states with the lowest levels of current voter registration and 
turnout.14  Similarly, a comment by law professor Marci Hamilton explains 
that Shelby’s ruling was a “no-brainer” rather than a dramatic change in 
constitutional substance because Congress chose a policy approach “not 
tethered” to fact.15    
 
As in Shelby County, the majority in State Farm determined that a 
government strategy for deterring institutionalized wrongdoing was so 
lacking in rational support that special judicial intervention was justified to 
protect the federal citizenship rights of corporations.16  State Farm ruled that 
a state award of $145 million in punitive damages in a civil case arbitrarily 
deprived the corporate defendant of property in violation of the corporation’s 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.17  
 
Two questionable implicit normative judgments ground the Court’s 
analysis of rationality in these cases. First, in both cases the Court presumes 
that the wrongdoing at issue can only be legitimately understood as a 
problem of isolated irrational and arbitrary mistake or misdeed, not as a 
rational system calculated to produce ongoing gain through unlawful power. 
Second, in both cases the Court determines that the government’s strategy 
for controlling the acknowledged wrongdoing risks producing illegitimate 
systemic, ongoing bias against the wrongdoers meriting unusual judicial 
13 Suzanna Sherry, It’s Congress’s Fault, The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Act Decision: Live 
Updates, June 25, 2013, posted on Aaron Blake, POST POLITICS (blog of Washington Post, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/25/the-supreme-courts-voting-
rights-act-decision-live-updates/ last visited June 2013. 
14 Id.  
15Marci A. Hamilton, The Inevitable Holding in Shelby v. Holder, And its Fallout, JUSTIA, June 
25,2013.  
16 See Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in State Farm, 56 
BUFF. L. REV. 1035 (2008) (criticizing the majority’s due process analysis).  
17 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Cnty. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429. 
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intervention. In the constitutional picture colored by these two assumptions, 
both state and federal government power loses legitimacy when directed at 
limiting long term unlawful institutional gain derived from exploiting racial 
and economic inequality.   
 
 A.  Denying the Rationality of Deterrence  
 
Turning to the first presumption, regarding the nature of the problem, 
the majority opinion acknowledged that, when originally enacted in 1965, the 
coverage formula was rationally designed to target the problem of 
discriminatory “tests and devices for voter registration” combined with 
evidence of low turnout of voters of color in the jurisdictions selected for 
coverage.18 The question, however, was whether Congress could continue to 
target its enforcement to those jurisdictions fifty years later, when voter 
turnout and registration rates “approach parity”19 with other jurisdictions, 
and when those targeted jurisdictions showed evidence of substantial 
improvement in racial minority voting and representation.  The majority 
agreed that these improvements “are in large part because of the Voting 
Rights Act.”20  
  
Nonetheless, the majority rejected the rationality of using successful 
deterrence as a reason for maintaining the original enforcement targets when 
renewing the Act in 2006.  The problem, according to the majority opinion, 
was that this deterrence rationale plausibly could extend indefinitely:  these 
jurisdictions could not disprove their particular risk through empirical 
evidence of improvement in voter turnout or registration. 21  Because the 
majority deemed this deterrence rationale illegitimately broad, it went on to 
fault Congress for its lack of new empirical evidence showing that the 
problems in the covered jurisdictions remain worse than in others.  The 
majority’s rejection of the deterrence theory is noteworthy given the 
prominence and power in contemporary jurisprudence of economic rationales 
justifying policy with predictions about ongoing or future behavior – 
predictions based not on detailed current empirical evidence but instead on 
deductive logic from general assumptions about calculated gain-seeking in 
response to incentives.22    
18Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct at 2616. 
19Id. at 2617. 
20Id. at 2618 (emphasis in original).  
21 Id. at 2619. 
22 See e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 79-97 (4th ed. 2011) (using 
an economic theory of law enforcement centered on deterrence theory); see also Judicial 
Symposium on the Law and Economics of Crime and Punishment, Law and Economics Center, 
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 According to Shelby County‘s majority opinion, the evidence of 
pervasive discrimination in the covered jurisdictions forty years ago has “no 
logical relation to the present day.” 23 To the contrary, Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent argued that pervasive historical race discrimination, along with 
recent evidence of ongoing patterns of new forms of discrimination, could be a 
reasonable basis for predicting particular future risk meriting preventative 
enforcement.  Categorically severing the links in this causal chain, the 
majority insisted that the current discrimination in the targeted jurisdictions 
appears less “‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant’ widespread’ and ‘rampant’ than in 196524 -
- overriding Congress’s explicit judgment that the evidence showed the 
problem remained “serious and pervasive.”25  The majority therefore assumes 
that in some unstated point in time the Act’s formula for targeting deterrence 
became unnecessary and capricious rather than reasonable. The majority 
further dismissed the dissent’s analysis of the substantive connection 
between the jurisdictions’ previous strategies for undermining voting rights 
and current evidence of “second generation” barriers to non-white electoral 
power, such as racial gerrymandering.26  Instead, the majority noted that the 
original coverage formula was based on the essentially different problem of 
particular impediments to casting ballots rather than on the weight of 
minority voting.27  
 
These categorical judgments suggest the view that racial 
discrimination in voting is naturally isolated in time and scope.  The 
majority’s analysis forecloses the possibility that the historical discrimination 
in the covered jurisdictions involved particular institutions designed to 
produce long term unlawful political power, such as an especially racially 
identified and racially polarized political party structure.28  Indeed, as the 
dissent emphasizes, Congress found these objectionable voting changes were 
not accidental or isolated irrational actions but rather were “calculated 
decisions to keep minority voters from fully participating in the political 
George Mason University, April 19-21, 2012,  http://www.masonlec.org/site/files/2012/04/C-P-
Agenda-FINAL-with-links-4.17.121.pdf, (opening a judicial training program with this reading). 
23 133 S.Ct at 2629. 
24 Id. at 2629. 
25 133 S.Ct at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 679 F. 3d. at 865).  
26 133 S.Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
27 Id. at 2629. 
28 See 133 S.Ct at 2643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress relied on evidence showing 
“that voting in the covered jurisdictions was more racially polarized than elsewhere in the 
country”)  (citing H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 34-35); see also 133 S.Ct at. 2634 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (noting that this racial polarization increases the vulnerability of minority citizens).  
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process.”29 If these jurisdictions’ past pervasive discrimination was motivated 
by the desire to maintain and exacerbate racially privileged access to 
resources and power, current evidence of strong non-white voter turnout in 
covered jurisdictions could be logically consistent with a special continuing 
risk of backlash meriting heightened prevention efforts.  In fact, Ginsburg’s 
dissent noted Congress considered evidence in 2006 showing an increase in 
voting changes in the covered jurisdictions deemed objectionable because of 
racial discrimination in the period from 1982 to 2004 compared with the 
earlier period of enforcement from 1965to 1982.30  
 
 Similarly, in this understanding of the motive for historical voting 
barriers, recent redistricting to strengthen partisan power and incumbent 
strength could be logically linked to past discriminatory voter registration 
tests and efforts to suppress turnout.  Shelby County’s majority opinion 
rejects the evidence and logic of this kind of institutional analysis not simply 
as unpersuasive, but rather as inherently illogical and undeserving of the 
general deference accorded to plausible legislative policy judgments.   
 
 The majority’s substantive judgment about the nature of the problem 
underlies its further discussion doubting (without deciding) the rationality of 
the preclearance solution, 31 which now is inoperable without a valid coverage 
formula. The majority concludes by noting the Act’s nationwide ban on race 
discrimination remains enforceable with post hoc litigation.32  However, if the 
underlying motive for discrimination in covered jurisdictions centers on 
skewing elections to institutionalize racial power, rather than on harming 
individual voters, prevention of that institutionalized inequality will be 
crucial. As the dissent explains, Congress had evidence that case-by-case 
enforcement through litigation challenging past discriminatory practices is 
likely to be ineffective compared to preclearance review,33 in part because 
discriminatory elections secure the long term political and economic 
advantages of incumbency– a problem that would be difficult to rectify or 
undo after the fact, especially given that the evidence required to prove a 
violation could take several election cycles to establish.34  
 
29 133 S.Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep. 109-478, at 21).  
30 133 S.Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
31 133 St.Ct. at. 2625 (stating that Shelby County’s arguments challenging the constitutionality of 
the preclearance requirement “have a good deal of force”).  
32 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (noting that the decision “in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on 
racial discrimination in voting”). 
33 133 S.Ct. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
34 133 S.Ct. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 1 EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING NEED 97). 
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Shelby County’s rejection of Congress’s institutional deterrence theory 
echoes State Farm’s rejection of a state court’s reasoning for awarding 
punitive damages against a multistate corporation.  In that case, the state 
court found that a national insurance company engaged in particularly 
reprehensible illegal conduct in breaching its legal obligations to defend the 
insured plaintiff in an automobile accident liability lawsuit. 35  The state 
awarded punitive damages at a level much higher than the plaintiff’s 
compensatory damages, based on evidence that the plaintiffs’ injury was 
caused not by isolated error or malice but instead by a corporate plan and 
institutional system designed to profit by denying policyholders’ rights and to 
evade law enforcement efforts.36  In that theory, deterring future unlawful 
activity by the company in that state could reasonably require a damage 
award set high enough to threaten the company’s expected gains from this 
larger system of wrongdoing. 
 
 State Farm ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause 
barred this punitive damages award because the state’s theory connecting 
this case’s injury to broader evidence of institutional wrongdoing was 
fundamentally irrational.   In the majority opinion’s reasoning, the state 
court illegitimately aimed “to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation” 
to the plaintiffs’ injury. 37 The Court argued that the state court could not 
legitimately connect the evidence of an insurance company’s conduct in other 
states or in other lines of insurance to predict and deter the risk of recidivism 
in its own jurisdiction because the Court determined that evidence involved 
categorically separate types of insurance using essentially disconnected 
strategies of illegal gain.38 
 
 As in Shelby County, Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in State 
Farm takes a more detailed look at the evidence to show the rationality of the 
theory of institutional causation underlying the high punitive damages 
award.39  Ginsburg notes “ample evidence” showing the plaintiffs’ injury was 
not caused by “inadvertent error or mistake”40 but rather was part of a long 
term nationwide “wrongful profit and evasion scheme”41 implemented across 
insurance lines and states by top corporate management.  Ginsburg 
explained that the state court relied on evidence showing that that plan was 
35 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 415-16. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 422. 
38 Id. at 425. 
39 See id. at 431-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
40 Id. at 437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
41 Id. at 435 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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implemented through corporate-wide systems for undervaluing claims, 
falsifying claims records, and destroying documents to avoid law enforcement, 
as well as through institutional incentives pressuring employees to 
participate in these unlawful schemes. 42   The state court could have 
reasonably judged that this evidence showed particularly reprehensible 
wrongdoing likely to have caused numerous other injuries to consumers in 
the same state43 and likely to continue to pose an ongoing risk difficult to 
control in that state without unusually high punitive damages calculated to 
counter future opportunities for large wrongful scale gains likely to evade law 
enforcement.  
 
 In the majority’s theory, the plaintiffs were at risk solely because they 
were Utah automobile liability claimants victimized by the insurance 
company’s bad faith legal defense, so that the state had no basis for 
considering other forms of insurance claims fraud in determining the amount 
of punitive damages needed for deterrence. Instead, Ginsburg cites trial court 
testimony showing the corporation’s employees “were trained ‘to target the 
weakest of the herd’ –‘the elderly, the poor, and other consumers who are 
least knowledgeable about their rights and thus most vulnerable to trickery 
or deceit, or who have little money’ and who therefore lack the power to 
enforce their legal rights.”44   
 
 This evidence supports the theory that the corporate defendant’s 
institutional position as a multistate business gave it the economic power and 
motive to subvert the law.  Its large scale organization and wealth enabled 
the company to build competitive advantage and economic gain by 
systematically cheating a large class of unorganized and non-wealthy 
customers, profiting from wrongdoing that produced gain likely to far 
outweigh the costs of getting caught and punished in individual cases, where 
the low value of individual claims and information barriers would often make 
litigation unaffordable and ineffective.45  To counter this unequal power to 
evade the law, the state civil justice system used its authority to award 
punitive damages to help position modest-income policyholders as if they 
were organized (like the insurance corporations) across states and across 
insurance lines to protect their rights. Like the majority in Shelby County, 
however, State Farm categorically denies the legitimacy of a theory 
interpreting particular evidence of wrongdoing as part of a pattern of ongoing 
42 Id. at 431-32 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
43 Id. at 436-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. at 433-34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
45 See McCluskey, supra note 16, at 1053-54 (criticizing the Court’s denial of economic class power 
in the case). 
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institutional exploitation of a disadvantaged group for deliberate unlawful 
gain.   
 
B.  Reconstructing Deterrence as Illegitimate Bias Against the 
Power to Evade Law 
 
In addition to rejecting the government’s reasons as insufficient, in 
both cases the Court goes further to impute illegitimate reasons to the 
enforcement strategy at issue.  In doing so, the Court embraces a structural 
perspective in which the government’s chosen remedy risks systematic 
victimization of a distinct group whose members share similar institutional 
vulnerability.   
 
 In Shelby County, the Court characterizes the coverage formula as 
discrimination against particular states based on their sovereign identity.  
The Court justifies its seemingly demanding scrutiny of the evidence for the 
coverage formula by noting the Voting Rights Act’s “extraordinary” nature 
due to its “stringent” and “potent”46 intrusion into “sensitive areas”47 of “a 
disfavored subset of States.”48  It asserts the need for judicial intervention to 
ensure that states enjoy a century-old tradition of “equal power, dignity and 
authority.”49  In this narrative, the legislation’s purpose and effect is not 
merely to ensure current equal state compliance with national constitutional 
rights by tailoring the timing and quality of federal review. Instead, this 
narrative infuses the mere process of federal review of illegal race 
discrimination with pernicious substantive meaning that seems (in the 
majority’s view) to eclipse the wrongfulness of the underlying problem of 
unconstitutional race discrimination in voting.   
 
 The majority imagines the act of accounting to the federal government 
for an electoral change as a shared trauma and stigma cutting to the core of 
states’ identity and authority.  In the Court’s narrative, when a covered 
jurisdiction must show Voting Rights Act compliance before adopting 
electoral changes, that action does not bolster its position as a responsible 
constitutional partner proudly fulfilling its commitment to a national 
democratic union upholding the law.  Instead, the Court constructs selection 
for preclearance review as an infantile position where states are forced to 
“beseech” federal authorities for permission to exercise what the Court 
46133 S.Ct. at 2624. 
47 Id. 
48133 S.Ct. at 2628. 
49 Id. at 2624. 
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presents as important state rights to control elections. 50 The Court does not 
discuss any actual evidence of harmful effects or of discriminatory 
Congressional intent toward the covered states, nor does it explain why its 
judgment about states’ interests should override that of the Senators 
representing the covered states, all of whom voted in favor of continued 
coverage.  Indeed the dissent notes that the evidence instead shows 
substantial benefits to states from being targeted for preclearance – such as 
savings in litigation costs.51   
 
 Further, the Court’s narrative assumes its imagined harm to each 
covered jurisdiction is not an isolated bureaucratic hassle affecting a variety 
of disparate governmental decisions. Instead, the Court constructs this 
imagined and highly variable harm as part of a larger structural pattern of 
harm with fundamental constitutional implications.  The Court presumes, 
without inquiry into Congressional intent, that the law involves federal 
discrimination against states, rather than, more precisely and neutrally 
identifying its target as jurisdictions, including not only states as a whole but 
also particular subdivisions like counties,52 defined by a variety of specific 
factors related to their voting practices. Further, the Court presumes that 
states lack sufficient power to protect their interests against such 
discrimination in the normal federal political processes, despite the 
constitutional design of the Senate giving States equal representation. The 
Court does not discuss any evidence of barriers to states’ ability to assert 
their alleged interests in the Senate’s unanimous vote in 2006 re-authorizing 
the coverage provision.  
 
 Constitutional scholar Marci Hamilton develops the Court’s 
implications of systemic bias by explaining the coverage formula not only as a 
problem of Congress’s passivity -- shirking its purported duty to gather 
sufficient supporting facts -- but also as an expression of active partisan 
animus and prejudice (despite its overwhelming bipartisan support). 53  
Hamilton suggests Congress resisted changing the formula because of 
irrational stereotypes that the Republican party is too intransigent and 
50 133 S.Ct. at 2616. 
51 133 S.Ct. at 2615. (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (citing Reauthorizing the voting Rights Act’s 
Temporary Provisions:  Policy Perspectives and Views from the Field:  Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitutional, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess.,pp. 13, 120-121 (2006); Brief for States of New York, 
California, Mississippi, and North Carolina as Amici Curiae 8-9).  
52 133 S.Ct. at 2620 (discussing 1975 changes in the Act’s coverage to include a number of counties, 
as well as 1982 changes allowing bailout of subdivisions of states).  Indeed, the petitioner in 
Shelby was not a state, but a county. 
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oppressive to be trusted to participate in creating a currently rational 
enforcement strategy.54 This suggestion echoes Justice Scalia’s comment at 
oral argument that the law is suspect because “the normal political processes” 
are so biased in favor of protecting “racial entitlements” that members of 
Congress face illegitimate political pressure to renew the law. 55  These 
comments deny the legitimacy of the unanimous Senate vote by constructing 
the covered states’ Senatorial support as a sign that covered states are 
victims of political suppression so pervasive that it makes them dependent on 
judicial intervention.  
 
 Just as Shelby County assumes the covered states confront shared 
structural barriers to defending their interests in Congress, State Farm 
similarly suggests that pervasive structural victimization prevents multistate 
corporations from seeking state or federal legislation to adequately protect 
their interests in limiting punitive damage awards.  In addition to criticizing 
the arbitrary basis for the punitive damage award, the Court goes on to 
identify the state court’s award with a broader pattern of corporate 
victimization.  It notes that the state court illegitimately took into account 
evidence of the insurance company’s wealth, quoting a previous case warning 
“juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses.”56  In 
this analysis, the majority assumes the insurance company shares common 
vulnerability with wealthy corporations in different lines of business accused 
of different types of wrongdoing-- despite the majority’s refusal to recognize 
any shared vulnerability among insurance consumers with modest wealth 
but different types of insurance claims.   
 
 As in Shelby County, the Court in State Farm not only limits 
rationality to one-way recognition of the risk of wealth-based discrimination, 
it also assumes, without evidence, that this distinctive vulnerability of 
powerful wrongdoers extends beyond the particular enforcement process at 
issue (judicial punitive damage awards) and into the political system in 
general. State Farm’s ruling assumes that the shared vulnerability from 
(theoretical) anti-corporate bias requires judicial creation of a fundamental 
federal substantive due process right.  In this view, wealthy multistate 
corporations are particularly disadvantaged in the political process and 
54 Id. 
55 Justice Antonin Scalia, Oral Argument transcript, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, Feb. 27, 2013, at 47; 
see also Amy Davidson, In Voting Rights, Scalia Sees “Racial Entitlement”, NEW YORKER:  CLOSE 
READ BLOG, Feb. 28, 2013 (discussing Scalia’s comment). 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/02/in-voting-rights-scalia-sees-a-racial-
entitlement.html. 
56538 U.S. at 417, quoting Honda Moter Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 532 (1994). 
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distinctly unable to lobby Congress for federal legislation protecting them 
from excessive state damage awards. 57  In addition, State Farm expands 
federal courts’ power to invalidate individual state punitive damage awards 
without requiring case-by-case proof of duplicative state punishments or 
evidence of particularly devastating economic threat to a national corporation. 
That is, State Farm treats corporate wrongdoers as deserving the kinds of 
preventative federal control of state class bias it denies in Shelby County for 
victims of state racial bias: corporations subject to punitive damage awards 
by individual states do not have to wait for case-by-case judicial intervention 
until after they are subject to numerous state damage awards for the same 
national wrongdoing.   
 
III. Conclusion:  Protecting Unequal Power Over Law  
 
Although neither Shelby County nor State Farm directly bars the 
government from outlawing the harmful activity at issue – racially 
discriminatory voting practices or insurer bad faith – both cases limit the 
government’s authority to give meaningful force to these formal rules. Taken 
together with State Farm and other recent rulings, Shelby County may 
herald not so much a new federalism as a revival of an older constitutional 
ideal assuming that law’s protection normally and naturally must bend to 
accommodate the weight of unequal economic and racial power.  
 
These two cases show unusual solicitude to the potentially harmful 
effects of preventative law enforcement, and unusual skepticism about the 
evidence used to predict and control future wrongdoing.  This heightened 
concern for limiting government law enforcement authority is striking 
because the principles established by these cases do not protect individual 
human liberties but rather are directed solely at preserving the power of 
institutions:  states (or other governmental units) in Shelby County and 
multistate business defendants in State Farm.  The Court has often been 
much less willing to protect individual criminal suspects from law 
enforcement strategies based on dubious evidence of future risk or even based 
on substantial risk of racial or economic bias.58 Individual human victims of 
overreaching law enforcement are likely to be disproportionately racially and 
57 See McCluskey, supra note 16, at 1055-56 (arguing that this heightened concern for supposed 
anti-business bias turns Carolene Products note four on its head, protecting an especially 
politically powerful group from the democratic process).  
58 See e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 297 (1987) (refusing to apply heightened judicial scrutiny 
to Georgia’s death penalty despite evidence that its distinctive reliance on discretion had 
disparate racial effects and increased the risk of intentional racial bias – and that it also reflected 
a particular state history of racial discriminatory intent).  See also McCluskey, supra note 16, at 
1043-47 (discussing the Court’s unequal concern for due process interests of corporate defendants).  
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economically disadvantaged, raising the question whether the Court’s special 
protection in these cases is particularly skewed toward accommodating 
unlawful power that exacerbates racial and economic inequality.  
 
Of course, the Court justifies its rulings in Shelby County and State 
Farm not as protection against institutional wrongdoers’ interest in violating 
the law, but rather as protection against their legitimate interests in relief 
from the burdens of particular prevention strategies. But these “burdens” 
appear to consist mainly of decreased power to organize and entrench illegal 
exploitation of groups made vulnerable precisely because of their exclusion 
from comparably powerful institutional protection. In Shelby County, the 
Court protects the state’s interest in implementing possibly unlawful 
electoral changes without the delay of federal oversight.  Although that 
interest in avoiding delay might seem benign, it is a key source of the 
unlawful power at issue: the ability to entrench political racial inequality 
through incumbency so that future enforcement actions will be less 
meaningful.  In State Farm, the Court protects corporate wrongdoers from 
the risk that engaging in large scale multistate wrongdoing will subject them 
to unusually high and overlapping damage awards (or, more likely, from the 
less disruptive costs of having to devote company legal and economic 
resources to seeking national legislative relief from such risks).  But the 
multistate corporation’s ability to spread and offset the cost of relatively 
predictable, isolated and individualized damage awards over a large volume 
of unlawful gains was exactly what gave it the power to profit from cheating 
its modest-income individual customers.59  
 
The Civil War Amendments stand for reconstructing a constitutional 
system characterized not only by racially unequal rules but also by 
institutional force operating above and against lawful government efforts to 
advance equality.60  Shelby County joins with State Farm to retreat from that 
goal, subordinating both state and federal authority to the interest in 




59 See McCluskey, supra note 16, at 1040-42. 
60 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (ruling the Constitution bars the federal 
government from using Civil War Amendment powers to enforce the law in response to a white 
supremacist massacre aimed at usurping the local government).  See James Gray Pope, Snubbed 
Landmark: How United States v. Cruikshank Shaped Constitutional Law and Racialized Class 
Politics in America, 49 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 385 (2014). 
229 
 
                                                        
